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Introduction 
As China’s economic and financial power increases, concerns grow about its potential to 
remake the international economic order in the post-crisis world. The likely impact of China’s 
ascent on the future of the international order is much debated.1 Optimists hold that China and 
                                                          
1
 On the cautiously optimistic views of Western observers, for example, see G. John Ikenberry, ‘The Rise of 
China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?’ Foreign Affairs 87:1 (2008), pp.23-37; Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, ‘Clash of the Titans—Make Money, Not War’, Foreign Policy, January 5, 2005; Daniel W. Drezner, ‘Bad 
Debts: Assessing China’s Financial Influence in Great Power Politics,’ International Security 34: 2 (2009), pp.7-45. 
On the relatively pessimistic views, for instance, see John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 2001); Robert Kagan, ‘End of Dreams, Return of History’ in Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. 
Legro (eds) To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
For Chinese commentators’ discussions of China’s revisionist foreign economic policies, for instance, see  Yu 
Zhonghua (2009), ‘Peiyu duoji  junshi zhiheng meiyuan baquan’[Check the hegemony of the dollar by cultivating 
multipolar balance], Guoji Jinrong Bao [International Financial News], 6 August, 2009 
(http://ifb.cass.cn/show_news.asp?id=18591); Zhang Ming, ‘China’s New International Financial Strategy amid the 
Global Financial Crisis’, China & World Economy 17:5 (September–October), 2009, pp.22-35; Pang Zhongying, 
‘Zhongguo zai guoji tixi zhong de diwei yu zuoyong’[China’s Status and Role in the International System], Xiandai 
guoji guanxi [Modern International Relations], no.4, 2006, pp.17-22; Henry Gao, ‘China's Ascent in Global Trade 
Governance: from rule taker to rule shaker and, maybe rule maker?’ in Carolyn Deere Birkbeck (ed) Making Global 
Trade Governance Work for Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 153-180.  
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other emerging economies will ultimately integrate into the West-centered liberal order—the 
eventual assimilation view. In contrast, pessimists contend that China will challenge the United 
States and the American-led world order—the systemic conflict view. The behavior of 
international financial institutions is an important indicator of whether a state is pursuing status 
quo or revisionist foreign policies, an issue of increasing significance in light of China’s rise.2 
       This article argues that the dichotomous views fail to capture China’s nuanced and 
balanced attitude towards global financial governance. Beijing’s interaction with regional and 
global financial institutions suggests neither one-way assimilation into an American-centered 
liberal order nor a collision course with the United States and its Group of Seven (G-7) allies. 
Beijing seems to be walking a fine line between assimilation and confrontation. Since the early 
2000s, China has been pursuing a counterweight strategy to avoid overdependence on existing 
global institutions by developing a regional supplement (or potential alternative) while 
maintaining collaborative relations with the G-7 centered global institutions. This strategy has 
enabled China to better position itself in the evolution of the international monetary order 
without antagonizing key players outside the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing is hedging its economic 
bets on the creation of regional institutions and the revision of global institutions. Such 
behavior will facilitate the emergence of a more fragmented and multilayered form of global 
financial governance in the twenty-first century.  
                                                          
2
  The eventual assimilation view tends to highlight that Western global economic governance is universally 
accepted because China and other rising powers have consistently participated in, for example, WTO negotiations 
or IMF meetings. However, this claim may be partially correct. One cannot rule out the possibility that Chinese 
behavior may prove to be revisionist, albeit not revolutionary, in that China has been (and will be) gradually 
counterbalancing Western influence and revising key components of the existing international order from within.       
 3 
The empirical findings of the article also have broader implications for academic and 
policy debates over power transition in international relations—the rise and fall of great powers 
and the subsequent impact on international conflict and cooperation. To extend the logic of 
China’s financial multilateralism, one may even cautiously anticipate that if a rising China takes 
a middle-of-the-road approach towards other dimensions of regional and global governance, 
such as security, trade, environment and energy, today’s power transition would generate a 
more decentralized and fragmented form of global governance, which challenges the 
dichotomous views of ‘eventual assimilation’ and ‘systemic conflict.’ This point seems to be not 
sufficiently highlighted by students of Chinese foreign policy and power transition. 
Some caveats are in order. This study does not intend to make a systematic test of all 
the relevant theories3 or conduct an in-depth case study of specific financial policies. For 
                                                          
3 For example, there are at least three prominent theoretical perspectives on the genesis of East Asian financial 
regionalism—realist, liberal and constructivist perspectives. Scholarly work taking a realist perspective tends to 
stress the role of structural power or the balance of power in the genesis of the East Asian financial architecture. It 
traces institutional origins to power rivalry among China, Japan and the United States, which often use institutions 
as means of statecraft. For example, see William W. Grimes, Currency and Contest in East Asia: The Great Power 
Politics of Financial Regionalism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press (2009); and Jonathan Kirshner, ‘Money, 
Capital and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region,’ in G. J. Ikenberry and T. Inoguchi (eds.) The Uses of Institutions: 
The U.S., Japan, and Governance in East Asia, Palgrave Macmillan (2007), pp. 187–216. Liberal approaches 
highlight the creation of regional institutions to manage the growing economic interdependence of nations in the 
region and to pursue efficiency. The liberal economic discourse focuses on the functional need for new institutions 
to resolve common problems and to achieve higher welfare gains for the region. See Jennifer A. Amyx, ‘A Regional 
Bond Market for East Asia? The Evolving Political Dynamics of Regional Financial Cooperation’, Pacific Economic 
Paper No. 342, Australian National University, Australia-Japan Research Centre (2004); and Masahiro Kawai ‘East 
Asian Economic Regionalism: Progress and Challenges’, Journal of Asian Economics, 16(1): 29–55, 2005. Social 
constructivists claim that the origins of institutional preferences can be traced to converging norms, identities and 
legitimacy. They argue that East Asia’s normative emphasis on a consultative, flexible and incremental approach, 
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reasons of space, the article focuses on politically high-profile cases which involve Chinese top 
decision makers, instead of discussing a variety of all the different aspects of the global and 
regional financial systems. Despite the potential danger of selection bias, hopefully this 
approach may generate useful insights and hypotheses that can be tested by future research in 
a more rigorous manner.       
       The article is organized as follows. The following section provides a brief overview of the 
key macrostructural changes that have allowed China to bargain with regional and global 
financial institutions. The focus here is on power, norms and institutions at the international 
level. The second section discusses Beijing’s perception and attitude towards the evolving 
international monetary order.4 Specifically, this section highlights China’s sense of uncertainty 
about reforming global institutions and creating regional ones.5 The third section examines 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
as opposed to an ideological, universal and rule-binding one, and a regional identity based upon shared 
experiences of (semi-) colonial rule and state-led development, have contributed to the voluntary and self-paced 
nature of Asian financial regionalism. For instance, see Yong Wook Lee, ‘Japan and the Asian Monetary Fund: An 
Identity-Intention Approach’, International Studies Quarterly, 50(2): 339–66, 2006; and Injoo Sohn, ‘Asian Financial 
Cooperation: The Problem of Legitimacy in Global Financial Governance’, Global Governance, 11(4): 487–504, 2005.  
4
 It should be noted here that this article does neither assume nor claim the Chinese view (or a rising power’s 
view) of the current international financial system is necessarily correct or tenable. The article aims to describe and 
explain the Chinese view and behavior, instead of engaging in normative debates over whether the Chinese 
perception is appropriate and convincing.       
5
 While the students of mainstream international political economy have developed the domestic- politics 
models of foreign economic policy, the anecdotal evidence I collected indicates that there is no notable influence 
of non-state actors (e.g. interest groups) or sub-national actors (e.g. local governments) on China’s foreign 
financial policy and regionalism policy. Although there is little evidence to challenge the state-centered view of 
Chinese foreign financial policy, it is inappropriate to reject completely the pluralist (or domestic politics) 
hypotheses given the limited documentary evidence to us. When new information becomes available, our future 
research will be able to evaluate whether the pluralist model might have the value-added in explaining China’s 
 5 
what characterizes China’s interactions with regional and global financial institutions in the 
early twenty-first century. This article ends with briefly discussing the implications of the 
Chinese strategic behavior for the future trajectory of global financial governance.  
 
Power, Norms, and Institutions 
Beijing’s strategic behavior is related to the following fundamental changes at the 
international level—power shifts, normative fragmentation, and revived regionalism. These 
important macrostructural changes have conspired to condition China’s perception and 
behavior regarding the evolving international monetary order.6 The power shifts include not 
only China’s increasing material power vis-à-vis competing states but also a change from 
relatively symmetric interdependence to asymmetric interdependence between China and 
international financial institutions. First of all, there has been a fundamental shift in the global 
redistribution of wealth. The Chinese economy, which accounted for about one third of world 
GDP in the early nineteenth century but significantly declined afterwards, is close to resuming 
its historical position in the global economy.7 China and other key emerging economies are 
increasingly regarded as central rather than peripheral players in the global market, while the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
approach toward regional and global financial governance.  For a similar view of the limited influence of Chinese 
society on China’s regionalism policy, see Ming Wan, ‘The Domestic Politics of China’s Asian Regionalism Policy,’ in 
Vinod K. Aggarwal and Seungjoo Lee (eds.) Trade Policy in the Asia-Pacific: The Role of Ideas, Interests, and 
Institutions (New York: Springer, 2010).      
6
 It is important to clarify that this study treats the three macro-structural attributes as not key causal factors 
but permissive conditions that influence China’s strategic thinking about international financial governance.   
7
 Angus Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run (Paris: OECD Development Center, 2008). 
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developed world’s share of world GDP has been shrinking. China has become the world’s 
second largest economy in 2010, and according to the National Intelligence Council, a US 
government think tank, India will become the world’s fourth-largest economy by 2025.8  
   The decentralizing trend in international economic power has reshaped Beijing’s 
bargaining power with not only the United States and other G-7 players but also the key 
international financial institutions. China and the leading international financial institutions 
were largely mutually dependent in the 1980s. When China joined the IMF and the World Bank, 
it did so to acquire concession loans, managerial experience, and technology transfer. For these 
organizations, China was a big client that helped to boost their legitimacy as global institutions. 
However, the relative importance of the World Bank and the IMF to China has declined as the 
Chinese economy has matured and expanded and the country has gained additional sources of 
capital and advice in the 1990s and the 2000s. For example, China’s ability to attract foreign 
direct investment (FDI) as an engine of growth and restructuring has been unprecedented, as 
compared with other post-socialist or large developing countries in the 1990s. China was in a 
league of its own, attracting over $234 billion in net FDI in the 1990s against Brazil’s $66.3 
billion, Mexico's $61 billion and Russia’s $14.3 billion.9Moreover, recently China also began to 
exert creditor power over other developing countries by using its rapidly growing huge cash 
reserves accumulated through exports and profits at home. As developing countries had the 
                                                          
8
 National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 
Project (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2004). 
9
 World Bank, Global Development Finance: Analysis and Summary Tables, 1999 (Washington, D.C.: 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2000), pp.51. 
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option of receiving unconditional loans from creditors such as China, the capacity of the World 
Bank and the IMF to attach conditions to loans declined.10Furthermore, the IMF faces a growing 
need for increased contributions from China to refinance itself in the aftermath of the recent 
global financial crisis, even though China has not used any of the IMF’s financing facilities out of 
concern about IMF conditionalities. In other words, the World Bank and IMF need China more 
than China needs them. However, this is not to say that China has achieved the kind of what 
Susan Strange called “structural power” that hegemonic states could exercise.11 China is still not 
capable of setting a new global standard and revising existing institutions on its own. Moreover, 
the mutual dependence of the Sino-American financial relationship has constrained China’s 
relational power—the capacity of one player to force another to change its behavior—vis-à-vis 
the United States. The complex interdependence between China and the United States has 
significantly constrained China’s direct leverage over the U.S. financial policy and would 
generate a “balance of financial terror” (or a peaceful yet nervous coexistence), China’s rapidly 
growing financial muscle notwithstanding.12   
      At this juncture, neither a rising power nor a reigning power appears to be capable of 
dictating the terms of global financial governance on its own. Today’s power transition will 
make it more uncertain and difficult to predict the future trajectory of the international 
                                                          
10
 Ngaire Woods, ‘Whose Aid? Whose Influence? China, Emerging Donors, and the Silent Revolution in 
Development Assistance,’ International Affairs 84: 6 (2008), pp. 1205-21. 
11
 Susan Strange, States and Markets (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994) 
12
 Daniel W. Drezner, ‘Bad Debts: Assessing China’s Financial Influence in Great Power Politics,’ International 
Security 34: 2 (2009), pp. 44. 
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monetary system. China’s asymmetric interdependence with the international financial 
institutions nevertheless could increase China’s bargaining power, which would help it translate 
financial power into institutional power within both global and regional financial institutions. 
Because China has become less dependent on the keystone international financial institutions, 
it has a wider range of policy options and greater capacity to influence or assist international 
institutions. 
       The second of the structural changes is related to international norms, specifically, the 
shift from the “Washington Consensus” to normative fragmentation.13 There seems to be a 
decline in hegemonic neo-liberal ideas, and absent a new global consensus, creating a 
normative vacuum for global financial governance in the twenty-first century. Even when the 
Washington Consensus was still influential before the late 1990s, there was a mixed picture of 
China’s policy convergence with (or divergence from) international financial institutions. On the 
one hand, China accepted many of the global (liberal) standards suggested by the IMF, the 
World Bank, and other global regulatory agencies. On the other hand, Beijing resisted some 
liberal policy suggestions, notably capital account liberalization. In retrospect, China’s 
noncompliance with capital account liberalization helped China through the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997-1998 and the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. Beijing has also selectively 
adopted elements of the Basel regime (global banking standards) to achieve domestic financial 
reform (as will be discussed later). China also criticized the IMF’s approach to the Asian financial 
crisis, while the World Bank and IMF recognized the merit of the Chinese-style gradual 
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 The term Washington Consensus has been commonly used to describe a general orientation towards a 
market-based approach (e.g. trade liberalization, financial deregulation, and privatization of state enterprises).    
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approach to economic reform. As Ann Kent aptly notes, their mutual interaction with China led 
the World Bank and IMF to learn new ways of conceptualizing development and working with 
member states.14 
       Recently, normative fragmentation driven by international financial crises (especially 
the recent global financial crisis) has reinforced Chinese skepticism about the Washington-
knows-everything (or universal) approach. Beijing’s rationale for delegitimizing the universal 
model, as articulated by the Chinese premier Wen Jiabao at the Forum of China-Africa 
Cooperation, is worth quoting at length: 
“Many people are trying to offer prescriptions for Africa's development, such as the 
‘Washington Consensus’ or the ‘Beijing Model’. Yet it seems to me that Africa's development 
should be based on its own conditions and should follow its own path, that is, the African 
Model. All countries have to learn from other countries' experience in development. At the 
same time, they have to follow a path suited to their own national conditions and based on the 
reality of their own countries.”15This remark is consistent with China’s vision of a ‘harmonious 
world’ where multiple civilizations, development modes and social systems coexist.16 
                                                          
14
 Anne Kent, Beyond Compliance—China, International Organizations, and Global Security (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2007), pp.142. 
15
 Wen Jiabao, ‘FOCAC: Transcript of press conference by Premier Wen Jiabao,’ Pambazuka News, November 
12, Issue 457 (2009) (accessed at http://pambazuka.org/en/category/africa_china/60182). 
16
 For a detailed account of ‘harmonious world’, see Jianfei Liu, ‘Sino-US Relations and Building a Harmonious 
World’, Journal of Contemporary China, 18 (60), June 2009, pp. 479-490. 
 10 
The devaluation of the Washington Consensus has significantly undermined the ‘soft power’ 
of the United States and other G-7 countries and thereby given China greater bargaining power 
over the redesign of the global financial governance. The changing normative structure may 
open up an opportunity for China to become a rule-maker, as opposed to a rule-follower. 
However, the normative vacuum invites not only opportunity but also challenge. China is 
neither ready to lead global financial institutional reform as a principal innovator nor certain of 
the desirability of new overarching global regulations (the one-size-fit-all approach). Like other 
key players, China is struggling to find a new model of financial governance in the post-crisis 
world.17 With the both opportunity and challenge associated with normative fragmentation, 
China may engage in mutual adjustment and learning—two-way, reciprocal interaction—with 
G-7 centered institutions to create new norms and standards in international finance, as 
opposed to one-way assimilation or sharp confrontation. 
       The third of the macrostructural changes involves revived regionalism and the 
concomitant development of regional governance institutions. Although regionalism and 
regional institutions have been a consistent feature of the post-World War II global landscape, 
the end of the Cold War and economic regionalization have contributed to a new emphasis on 
regional institutions in Europe and other regions.18 Regarding financial regionalism in East Asia, 
                                                          
17
 Author’s interviews with Chinese financial experts in Beijing in December 2008 and August 2010. 
18
 Amitav Acharya, and Alastair Iain Johnston, Crafting Cooperation—Regional International Institutions in 
Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Recent financial regionalism in the 
developing world outside Asia includes the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)’s plan for a GCC monetary union, the 
African Union’s call for an African Monetary Fund, and the pursuit by the Union of South American Nations 
(UNASUR)’ of a common currency. 
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the bilateral swap arrangement under the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) has been transformed 
into a multilateral arrangement, which represents a significant step towards the creation of an 
Asian Monetary Fund. China and other East Asian countries have also sought to develop a 
vibrant regional bond market through the Asian Bond Fund (or Market) initiative to 
complement and possibly constrain the U.S.- and Europe-centered global capital markets. The 
rise of regional financial institutions may complicate collective efforts to establish a strong, 
inclusive and centralized financial institution at the international level, that is, a World Financial 
Organization that would be akin to the World Trade Organization.19 With the growing financial 
regionalism, the likely success of creating a super global institution would be doubtful and 
uncertain. Nevertheless, these alternative forms of regional governance could give rising 
powers a greater voice and more authority than might have been possible within existing global 
institutions. They might also complement (or even outperform) global institutions in addressing 
specific pressing regional problems. Regional institutions thus give China a feasible exit option 
when the existing global institutions become ineffective or irrelevant. 
 
Uncertainty about the Evolving International Monetary Order  
                                                          
19
 For the notion of a World Financial Organization, see Barry Eichengreen, ‘Not a New Bretton Woods but a 
New Bretton Woods Process,’ November 6, 2008. 
www.econ.berkeley.edu/~eichengr/not_new_bretton_woods.pdf (Accessed on August 10 2010) 
 12 
China’s policy elites are increasingly aware of the usefulness of multilateral cooperation and 
institutions in dealing with global challenges including international financial problems.20 
Positive-sum views, that are emphasizing international interdependence and joint gains, were 
increasingly becoming salient in the Chinese discourse from the late 1990s. An increasing 
number of policy elites began to hold the view that there would be growing space for 
multilateral cooperation to deal with the common problems of economic security such as 
international financial crisis. In October 1998, for instance, Dai Xianglong, the then Governor of 
the People’s Bank of China, mentioned that rapid economic globalization and the resulting 
Asian financial crisis led the international community to share concerns about economic 
security, and realize the need to strengthen the architecture of international financial 
governance.21In this view, unilateral response would be no longer effective enough to protect 
its own economy from future international financial turmoil given the interdependent nature of 
financial globalization; the unilateral strategy of holding a very large stock of foreign exchange 
reserves to deal with large yet infrequent capital flights is an extremely expensive strategy.22As 
                                                          
20
 For the details of a micro-level process of Chinese ideational change regarding regional multilateralism in 
the late 1990s, see Injoo Sohn, ‘Learning to Cooperate: China’s Multilateral Approach to Asian Financial 
Cooperation’, The China Quarterly, 194 (2008), pp.309-326. 
21
 Xinhua, ‘China: China urges strengthening architecture of monetary system,’7 October 1998 (In World News 
Connection). 
22
 A similar view of the limitation of unilateral response was articulated by Hu Jintao in his recent speech 
entitled “携手合作 同舟共济”[Let Us Join Hands and Tide over Difficulties] at the second Group of 20 (G20) 
financial summit in London in April 2009. http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2009/04-03/1630685.shtml 
(Accessed on January 9, 2011). 
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discussed above, many Chinese economists were also aware of the value of China’s interaction 
with the existing global financial institutions (e.g. the IMF, WB and BIS) in terms of obtaining 
managerial experience, financial support and regulatory knowledge, which may continue to 
help China to develop its relatively underdeveloped financial markets and regulations. 
Meanwhile, even some moderate Chinese realists, who tended to highlight a zero-sum form of 
international competition, have begun to recognize the strategic value of interaction and 
cooperation with multilateral institutions. For example, Yue Xiaoyong, a researcher of the State 
Council Research Office claimed that Beijing’s promotion of multilateralism diffused the “China 
threat” perception and thereby created a favorable environment for China’s development. 
Likewise, Yan Xuetong, a professor at the Tsinghua University also argued that China’s 
multilateral diplomacy contributed to consolidating China’s reputation as a responsible great 
power and a favorable external environment for China’s rise.23 In a similar vein, some Chinese 
financial experts hope that such interaction with multilateral financial institutions will help to 
insulate China from the destructive policies (e.g., financial protectionism) of irresponsible great 
powers and alleviate concerns about the “China threat” by showing China’s benign behavior in 
multilateral settings.24 
 Despite such growing positive-sum views and increased awareness of the strategic utility of 
multilateral diplomacy, however, China confronts deep uncertainty about the evolution of both 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
23
 ‘Duobian Zhuyi Yu Zhongguo Waijiao’ [Multilateralism and China’s Diplomacy], Teaching and Research 8 
(2005), pp. 6-17. 
24 Author’s interviews at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in December, 2008. 
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regional and global financial institutions. Uncertainty about the changing international 
monetary order and the aforementioned structural variables—power shifts, normative 
fragmentation, and revived regionalism—have influenced Chinese policy. At the global level, 
the prospects for the fundamental reform of global financial institutions have not been bright, 
from China’s point of view. Although the G-7 has made greater efforts to engage in dialogue 
with the rest of the world through the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and the Group of 20 (G-
20) since the Asian financial crisis, China’s expectations and those of other emerging economies 
remain unmet. The pre-global crisis FSF featured heavy G-7 representation, with key developing 
countries (such as China, India, Indonesia and South Korea) excluded. In addition, before the 
recent global financial crisis, the FSF and the G-20 tended to focus on the domestic aspects of 
reform (especially in developing countries) rather than international dimensions such as hedge 
funds, transnational capital flows, and offshore financial centers, which were suspected to be 
responsible for the speculative frenzy around the Asian crisis. For instance, while examining 
some of the international aspects of the financial crisis, the FSF resisted recommending any 
fundamental policy changes in these areas.25Similarly, the priority areas of the G-20 during its 
fifth meeting in 2003—increased financial liberalization, sound domestic financial markets, and 
the Action Plan on terrorist financing—were significant but had little to do with the primary 
concerns of China and other developing countries about the structural danger of trans-border 
capital mobility. One of the key measures of the post-Asian crisis reform was to bring domestic 
financial system of emerging markets in line with international standards, that is, the Anglo-
                                                          
25
 Roy Culpeper, ‘Systemic Reform at a Standstill: A Flock of ‘Gs’ in search of Global Financial Stability,’ 
University of Toronto G8 paper series (2000); www.library.utoronto.ca/g7/scholar/culpeper2000/index.html 
 15 
Saxon model.26 From the Chinese perspective, however, the diffusion of the neoliberal 
international standards alone would not necessarily ensure domestic and international financial 
stability—the devaluation of the neoliberal ‘Washington Consensus’. Although Chinese analysts 
found certain aspects of the Asian development model problematic in application, they tended 
to emphasize the fundamental problems of extant international economic order and 
governance as a source of the Asian financial crisis. For instance, an internally circulated 
Chinese governmental document noted that while 1994 Mexico Peso crisis and 1997 Asian 
financial crisis mainly resulted from global over-production and volatile international capital 
mobility, the victims of crises were nation-states in the periphery, rather than the core of the 
world economy.27 Accordingly, Beijing held the view that unbridled liberalization of financial 
markets could be dangerous and certain level of state control over transnational capital flow 
would be necessary for developing countries which lacked effective regulatory and supervisory 
capacity. This is consistent with China’s renewed emphasis on ‘financial security’ in the 
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis28 and Chinese persistent doubts about the existing 
international monetary system after the recent global financial crisis. For example, in July 2009, 
Li Ruogu, president of  the Export-Import Bank of China and former vice governor of the 
                                                          
26
 Andrew Walter, Governing Finance: East Asia’s Adoption of International Standards (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2008). 
27
 ‘Jingji quanqiuhua dui fazhanzhong Guojia Yiweizhe Shenme?’ [What are the implications of economic 
globalization for developing countries?], Neibu Canyue [Internal Reference Reading], January 27, 1999.  
28
 For example, see ‘‘Yingxiang woguo jinrong anquan de yinsuo ji yingdui cuoshe’’ [The factors 
affecting our financial security and our responding measures], Neibu canyue, 24 March 1999. 
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People’s Bank of China, stated that the global financial crisis “let us clearly see how 
unreasonable the current international monetary system is.” Likewise, Wang Jianye, chief 
economist of the Export-Import Bank of China has argued that the existing international 
monetary system fails to reflect the fundamental changes in the world economy, and is no 
longer workable.29 Similarly, at the meeting of International Monetary and Financial Committee 
in October 2009, Yi Gang, Deputy Governor of the People’s Bank of China pointed out that “the 
persistently misaligned quota shares and underrepresentation of emerging market and 
developing countries hamper Fund [IMF] governance and even-handed surveillance. It 
undermines Fund legitimacy and effectiveness.”30 
 Deep crisis like the recent global financial crisis holds the great potential for sweeping 
reform, but financial reform on a global scale is still full of uncertainty and contradiction. 
Despite the expansion of the membership of the FSF — now renamed Financial Stability Board 
(FSB) — before the 2009 London Summit to include all G-20 countries such as the BRICs (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China), the interests of the major G-20 players do not necessarily coincide.31 
                                                          
29
 Simon Rabinovich, ‘China officials call for displacing dollar, in time’, Reuters, 6 July, 2009; 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5650WO20090706; and Wang Jianye, ‘China’s intellectual contribution to 
addressing the “once-a-century” financial crisis’, China Daily, 25 March 2009; http://www.china 
daily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-03/25/content_7616815.htm 
30
 ‘Statement of Dr. Yi Gang, Deputy Governor of the People’s Bank of China at the Twentieth Meeting of the 
IMFC in Istanbul’, October 4, 2009; http://www.imf.org/external/am/2009/imfc/statement/eng/chn.pdf 
 
31
 As an astute Chinese observer notes, the G20 is not a group of like-minded nations, but one in which 
cooperation among the emerging powers is “issue-based and specific interest oriented”. The cooperation among 
these powers is complicated by “the fact that the economies and trade interests among these emerging powers 
 17 
Under the consensus principle (as opposed to majority voting), the larger group, the less likely 
there will be agreement and the more likely any agreement be diluted by the ‘lowest common 
denominator’ problem as in the cases of the stalemates paralyzing the Doha Round of 
multilateral trade negotiation. Also constraining the pace and scope of reform are the 
conservative tendencies of the status quo powers and the bureaucratic inertia of existing 
international institutions. Any attempt to boost China and other rising powers means that other 
countries will end up with less influence and lower profiles within the affected international 
institutions. These countries are more likely to resist reforms. Since many of the post-war 
institutions gave privileged positions to key European countries which were much more 
powerful in 1900 than in 2000 in terms of both military prowess and economic might, for 
example, these countries would be the losers in a redistribution (or reform) of institutional 
power to the Asia-Pacific, which would reflect today’s economic power shift. Hence, they may 
feel tempted to stall or sabotage any fundamental change in the decision making structure of 
global governance.32 Collective efforts to rewrite the rules of global financial governance are 
further complicated by the perceived absence of the kind of benign leadership exercised by the 
United States when the World Trade Organization (WTO) emerged. During the interwar years, 
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the United States was unwilling and Great Britain was unable to provide global public 
goods.33The consequence was a period of ineffective global governance. The capacity and 
willingness of today’s (relatively declining) hegemon, the United States, to assume the 
responsibility of providing global public goods remain to be seen. In other words, during today’s 
power transition, neither a rising power nor a reigning power seems to be capable of setting 
the terms of global financial governance on its own, thus increasing the sense of uncertainty 
about the future trajectory of the international monetary system. 
       At the same time, skepticism and uncertainty about the feasibility of East Asia’s efforts 
to create more cohesive regional arrangements or institutions prevails both within and outside 
China. Although the aforementioned ‘revived regionalism’ contributed to the emergence of 
financial regionalism in East Asia and other regions, a series of potential political and economic 
hurdles seem to shadow the future of Asian financial cooperation. Structural diversity, weak 
regional identity, power competition may conspire to impede the rise of a strong overarching 
regional financial architecture in the near future. Among the commonly identified structural 
barriers are diversities in financial sector development, industrial structure, policy and legal 
frameworks, and national regulatory capacities. The structural heterogeneity may considerably 
slow the pace of regional financial cooperation. Moreover, regional identity factor also could 
add uncertainty to future regional cooperation. There is a mixed picture of the salience of the 
East Asian identity over time. East Asian resentment against the post-Asian crisis IMF reforms 
contributed to the region’s sense of itself as a common (potential) victim in relation to Western 
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power, thus increasing the relational identity of Asia versus others.34Some Chinese pro-
multilateralists pointed out the emerging trends of East Asian identity. For example, Wu 
Jianmin, vice president of the Committee for Foreign Affairs under the National Committee of 
the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and president of China Foreign Affairs 
University said in his article of the People’s Daily35:  
“The East Asian cooperation has lasted for years on, and its identity is coming into being. 
There appear common values in the developing process of the cooperation among the East 
Asian nations, which I summarize as the following four Cs and one O: consultation, consensus, 
cooperation and comfort level and one O[openness]. Later some friends of mine from the East 
Asia suggest adding another C: closeness.” 
  However, in a skeptic’s view of the regional identity, political tensions over historical issues 
and disputed territories remain a potential threat to the salience of the East Asian identity. 
Strong nationalism and weak regional identity may continue to serve as an impediment to a 
spirit of regional cooperation.36Relatedly, the deep competition between China and Japan for 
regional leadership could also make regional institutions fragile. Thus it remains unknown 
whether the region’s political dynamics and evolving regional identity would frustrate East 
Asia’s collective efforts to promote financial regionalism. In sum, the ambiguity and uncertainty 
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inherent in creating regional institutions and reforming global ones has been a key driver of 
Chinese multilateral approach in the early twenty-first century. Against this background, Beijing 
has pursued a risk-averse counterweight strategy, that is, developing new regional financial 
arrangements and thereby avoiding overdependence on G-7 dominated global institutions 
while sustaining collaborative relations with those global institutions.  
 
Counterweight Strategy: The Choice of Not Making a Choice  
At the moment, China seems intent on exploring both global and regional options lest it 
should limit the range of strategic options available to itself. It intends to acquire more say over 
the running of the world economy and to resist the pressure of the reigning powers through its 
counterweight strategy. At the global level, while continuing to call for more substantial 
reforms on the existing global financial architecture, Beijing has been neither a key policy 
innovator nor a principal objectionist vetoing major policy initiatives. China has played a 
constructive role in the institutionalization of the G-20 summit and the reform of the FSF/FSB 
even though it did not take the lead in those global initiatives. In concert with Brazil, Russia, and 
India, China also agreed to contribute to IMF reserves, through the purchase of IMF bonds 
denominated in Special Drawing Rights, a weighted basket of major currency. In doing so, one 
may claim that China modestly sought to generate alternative to the dollar as a reserve 
currency.37However, it is important to stress that although China publicly endorsed the idea of 
revamping the dollar-based reserve system (which was indeed initiated by Russia), a notable 
departure from its usual low-profile behavior, it did not push too hard for the system’s 
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implementation. In March 2009, the head of the People’s Bank of China, Zhou Xiaochuan, 
proposed the creation of “super-sovereign reserve currency,” patterned after the IMF’s Special 
Drawing Rights as a way to diversify away from the U.S. dollar.38 Not surprisingly, the U.S. 
government rejected the calls to replace the dollar as the world’s reserve currency. 
Subsequently, Chinese officials did not bring up the issue in their private contacts with U.S. 
Treasury officials, and President Hu Jintao did not raise the issue in his meeting with President 
Obama in April 2009.39The G-20 communiqué did not even mention the dollar’s status after the 
G-20 London Summit in April 2009. This event suggests that while Beijing intends to work with 
key developing countries (other BRIC economies) on the reform of the dollar-based reserve 
system, it does not seek to directly challenge the United States.40 
Similarly, China’s strategic behavior regarding the G-7-proposed governance of Sovereign 
Wealth Fund (SWF) investment also represents its low-key and accommodating approach. SWFs 
are commonly defined as state-owned investment vehicles that invest globally. The most 
prominent SWFs come from authoritarian capitalist states. Of the top-twenty SWFs in terms of 
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asset size in 2007, seven were based in the Middle East and nine were based in the Pacific Rim 
Economies.41The growth of these SWFs, especially the Chinese SWF (the China Investment 
Corporation) provoked public concerns about excessive foreign influence over domestic 
industries and triggered proposals for regulations. The G-7 called on the IMF to draft a code of 
conduct for the SWFs. Accordingly, the IMF proposed an international work group (IWG) to 
draft a set of best practices in February 2008. By the spring of 2008, however, China was 
skeptical of the IMF work agenda on the SWF regulations. The China Investment Corporation 
(CIC) officials refused to participate in any IWG deliberations for the first half of 2008. Despite 
the initial reluctance of the key home countries of the SWFs, notably China, the G-7 continued 
to raise the issue of regulating the SWFs. The United States and the European Union highlighted 
a linkage between accepting a code of conduct and access to developed markets (or investment 
protectionism). At the bilateral meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue in June 
2008, then-Treasury Secretary Paulson indicated to his Chinese counterparts that a successful 
IMF process would contribute to lowering barriers to investment in the United States and 
Europe.42Such efforts yielded progress. In September 2008, China participated in the IWG 
meeting in Santiago, Chile. At the Santiago meeting, the more established SWFs and recipient 
countries (largely the OECD economies) could apply sufficient pressure on China and Russia to 
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accept agreement.43In the end, China and other member countries reached consensus on 
generally accepted principles and practices (GAPP), also known as the Santiago Principles, 
which address the legal and institutional framework, governance issue and risk management of 
the SWFs. Beijing thus has not created a major fissure in its relationship with key western 
players in the process of the GAPP code as the United States and the European Union, two large, 
deep and liquid financial markets, advocated common preferences over the SWF standards. 
 The similar feature of the Chinese international behavior—‘neither-innovator-nor-
objectionist’ can be also found in the area of global regulatory regimes. For the first time, China 
and other key emerging market countries have been brought into the inner circle of the G-7-
dominated global financial regulatory institutions in the aftermath of the recent global crisis. 
China has joined major global standard setting institutions, such as the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS), the Technical Committee of the International Organization of 
Securities Commission (IOSCO), the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and 
the Financial Stability Board (FSB) since 2008. However, China’s entry into such global 
institutions does not mean that it has fully accepted and internalized the norms and standards 
of the G-7-led global regulatory institutions. As Andrew Walter’s findings suggest, China has 
selectively adopted only what it needed from western regulatory models, adapted them to 
Chinese local circumstances, and implemented it in a gradualist manner to achieve domestic 
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financial reforms.44 For example, while Beijing largely accepted the Basel norm of ‘system 
stability’, it has been more skeptical and reluctant to accept the Basel norm of ‘competitive 
equality,’ which was intended to diminish competitive inequalities among international banks. 
In February 2007, the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission clearly stated that one goal of 
Basel II implementation is to increase the competitiveness of Chinese banks (vis-à-vis foreign 
banks). The CBRC also highlighted the need to gradually implement Basel II “based upon China’s 
realities.” 45 This nationally-determined, flexible and incremental method of policy 
implementation is largely consistent with the Chinese path of economic reforms in many other 
areas, such as private business restructuring, state-owned enterprise reforms, and rural de-
collectivization.46The post-Mao Chinese leaders employed risk-minimizing and experiment-
based approaches to modernization.47The phase “seeking truth from facts” and the slogan 
“crossing the river by groping for the stones” reflect the idea and norm of Chinese-style policy 
experimentation.  
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 As the global financial crisis erupted in the United States and revealed the weakness of the 
Anglo-Saxon model underlying the Basel regime, some Chinese officials began to openly 
express their concerns and criticism about the Basel regime.48China’s shifting behavior, 
however, falls short of directly challenging the existing global banking regulatory regime. 
China’s criticisms of the Basel regime, especially the Basel norm of market self-regulation, have 
largely echoed those of the United States and other G-7 countries. The parts of the Basel II 
associated with the “market discipline” allowed private market actors to play an increasingly 
significant role in the regulation of financial markets through market price-based assessments 
of risk and value. As the global crisis occurred and deteriorated, G-7 regulators have accepted 
the criticism that the Basel II’s support of the market price-based assessments incentivized 
banks to engage in excessive risk-taking during economic booms. Despite its growing discontent 
about the Basel regime, however, Beijing has neither departed markedly from its G-7 
counterparts nor presented any alternative regulatory standards on its own. In short, China’s 
strategic behavior in the global banking regulatory regimes suggests neither ‘one-way’ 
assimilation into the existing American-centered financial system nor a collision course with the 
United States and its G-7 allies.  
In the mean time, the early twenty first century witnesses the increased efforts of the 
Chinese government to promote financial cooperation at the regional level. A series of regional 
initiatives have been launched to increase regional self-sufficiency, ranging from information 
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sharing to liquidity support facility, regional bond market and currency cooperation. Among the 
new initiatives are the Chiang Mai Initiative (now the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization 
Agreement) and the Asian Bond Fund/Market Initiative. Beijing has been actively participating 
in the creation of regional liquidity support facility under the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) since 
2000. The CMI (now CMIM) is designed to provide liquidity support for the member countries 
that experience short-term balance-of-payment deficits in order to prevent an extreme crisis in 
a country and a subsequent regional contagion. In accordance with the CMI, China signed a 
series of agreements with Thailand, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines addressing the regional monetary-stability fund. This is in sharp contrast to Beijing’s 
past behavior, that is, its tacit opposition to the Tokyo-proposed idea of an Asian Monetary 
Fund in 1997. Since the 2007-8 global financial crisis erupted, China has strongly supported the 
idea of multilateralising the CMI and increasing the total size of the CMIM from US$80 billion to 
US$120 billion.49The recent global financial crisis appears to have pushed China into making an 
important compromise on a politically volatile issue, namely allocation of the CMIM 
contribution and the concomitant voting power in order to strengthen the regional defensive 
mechanism against systemic instability. In May 2009, two dominant powers, China and Japan, 
reached an agreement that China (including the mainland and Hong Kong, China), Japan and 
ASEAN would acquire an approximately 28 per cent voting share each, with South Korea 
receiving a 14 per cent voting share. This arrangement made it difficult for big countries (i.e. 
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China and Japan) to act alone or to block decision made by a majority of other countries as the 
threshold for approval – more than two-thirds of the total votes is needed to approve some key 
decisions – was set high under the CMIM. Without China’s embrace of the ‘self-restraining’ 
component of the CMIM voting structure, the CMIM could not have come into being in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis. 
China has also been making a significant contribution to the creation of the Asian Bond 
Fund (ABF) since 2003. The establishment of the ABF ultimately aims to: (1) bring back Asian 
foreign reserves that were traditionally channeled into Europe or the U.S. to be used in bond 
investments throughout Asia and (2) cushion the region against the external vulnerabilities by 
building more robust and diversified local capital markets. The member countries of the ABF 
include Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Hong Kong was nominated by the Executives’ Meeting of 
East Asia and Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP) as the preferred center for the initial listing of the 
Pan-Asian Bond Index Fund (PAIF). In May 2005, the Chinese government, one of the largest 
contributor of the ABF2, approved the PAIF to trade on the Chinese interbank bond market—
bonds issued by Chinese banks. This was an important Chinese-initiated measure as opening its 
local bond market was not one of China’s commitments to the World Trade Organization. 
Another noteworthy point is that the implementation of the ABF2 reflects the Chinese norm, 
namely, incremental, sovereignty-sensitive, and anti-universal approaches. The pace and timing 
of the opening of the ABF2’s eight single-market funds – each investing in local currency 
sovereign and quasi-sovereign bonds issued in their respective markets – to investors varied 
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across jurisdictions. Individual member states were allowed to identify market impediments in 
stages and deal with them at their own pace.50 
The aforementioned Chinese approach toward financial regionalism also represents its non-
confrontational counterweight strategy. China has attempted to reduce the exclusivity of the 
regional arrangements by advocating a CMI-IMF linkage, an Asian Bond-Eurobond linkage, and 
ABF-BIS collaboration. This strategic behavior helped the region to develop its supplementary 
institutions even as East Asia maintains collaborative relations with the IMF and other G-7-
centred global financial institutions. When it comes to the CMI-IMF linkage, the initial CMI 
required its member countries drawing more than 10 per cent from the CMI’s emergency fund 
to accept an IMF conditionality. Some participating countries, particularly Malaysia, called for 
de-coupling of the CMI from the IMF conditionality. Meanwhile, other members such as China 
argued for the importance of forging a cooperative relationship with the IMF at an early stage 
of the CMI development to make it more credible. After all, East Asian countries agreed to 
accept the linkage of the CMI to the IMF as a temporary arrangement until a formal surveillance 
mechanism is put in place. This compromise can be explained by two factors. First, the IMF has  
better institutionalized surveillance mechanisms that the ASEAN+3 lacks. The IMF conducts 
annual review of member country economies via Article 4 consultations, as well as, 
assessments of financial sector vulnerability through the Financial Sector Assessment Program. 
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For potential creditors such as China, it would be ineffective and inappropriate to lend funds to 
countries whose operations were not under this type of regular surveillance. Linking the CMI to 
the IMF can ensure that funds lent had a better chance of being repaid, even if China and other 
Asian countries remained critical of IMF conditionality per se.51In addition to the “efficiency (or 
functional)” consideration, the logic of interstate “power” structure also influenced China’s 
accommodating approach to the CMI. In the early 2000s, China and its Asian neighboring 
countries worried that the United States and the European Union (EU) would oppose a new 
Asian financial framework which lacks any IMF linkage as in the case of the aborted Asian 
Monetary Fund plan in 1997. Given the limited, albeit growing, political power of East Asian 
grouping vis-à-vis the United States and EU, China and other East Asian countries needed to 
reduce the independent nature of the CMI at the initial stage of regional financial integration. 
At the meeting of the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers in May 2001 in Honolulu, member countries 
agreed to review the issues of the IMF linkage with the CMI after three years had passed, 
leaving room for possible revision of the linkage requirement. In May 2005, the finance 
ministers of the East Asian governments agreed to double the size of the emergency funds that 
could be withdrawn without IMF conditionality from 10 per cent to 20 per cent. This revision 
represents the incremental approach taken by China and other CMI member states in loosening 
their adherence to the IMF conditionality. Whether or not the CMI eliminates their IMF linkage 
in the near future, the IMF linkage has made the CMI (now CMIM) look more inclusive (as 
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opposed to exclusive), thereby help to deflect suspicions and criticism from non-Asian 
economic powers.  
Similarly, while the ABF has the potential to challenge the dominance of the United States 
and EU in the global capital markets, the continuing emphasis that many Asian leaders have 
placed on the Asian-Bond-Eurobond linkage and the creation of a Euro Bond Market in Asia 
helped to mobilize EU support for the idea of an Asian Bond Market. In line with Asian-
European financial cooperation, for example, eleven Central Bank governors from the 
Executives’ Meeting of East Asia-Pacific (EMEAP), the president of the European Central Bank, 
and twelve governors from the Eurosystem National Central Banks held a joint high-level 
seminar in Singapore in 2004 to consolidate relations between EMEAP and the Euro-system. 
China and other EMEAP member countries also have worked closely with the Bank for 
International Settlement (BIS), a G-7 centered international organization of central banks to 
structure and manage the ABF. The investment management unit of the BIS, BIS Asset 
Management, has managed the ABF with teams based in its Representative Office for Asia and 
the Pacific and in the BIS head office. The BIS’s involvement with the ABF initiatives and its 
stable working relationship with EMEAP member central banks on other regional monetary 
issues in general provided additional platforms for policy dialogue and coordination between 
East Asia and key players outside the region. Overall, China and other East Asian countries 
made soft commitments,52instead of a strong form of commitment (e.g., threats of tightening 
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an exclusive economic alliance) to regional financial cooperation. This strategic behavior thus 
has prevented the formation of major rifts in the relations of East Asia, including China, with 
key actors outside the region and aided the further development of regional institutions. This is 
consistent with the Chinese view that regional financial initiatives should be pursued as a 
supplement to the existing global financial institutions. For instance, Zheng Liansheng, a leading 
expert at the Chinese Ministry of Finance’s Asia-Pacific Finance and Development Center 
argued that “East Asian monetary cooperation needs the mutual coordination of the IMF, the 
Asian Development Bank, and other existing international and regional organizations.”53 
 
Toward Fragmented Global Governance 
China’s strategy points to a rethinking of the current contrasting views of eventual 
assimilation and systemic conflict. There is little so far to suggest one-way assimilation into the 
G-7 centered liberal order or a collision course with the United States and its G-7 allies. In a 
time of the aforementioned macro-structural changes (i.e. power shifts, normative 
fragmentation, and revived regionalism), Beijing has sought to manage or reduce the 
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uncertainty associated with the evolving international monetary order by developing credible 
regional options without endangering its relationship with the G-7 centered global institutions. 
The CMIM and the ABF created counterweight enabling China to go beyond the IMF (or the G-
7) support in finance for development and crisis management. The CMIM and the ABF would 
serve as another means through which China can push forward its agenda gradually, but 
without antagonizing G-7. 
If emerging global reform consensus addresses China’s vital interest and concerns about the 
post-global crisis international financial system, China’s own position would move in a similar 
direction. However, if the evolving global financial governance institutions do not fully reflect 
China’s view, China is likely to continue developing regional supplements (or potential 
alternatives) through a moderate, incremental, and low-profile counterweight strategy. As an 
astute observer notes, “Being an active member of global multilateral bodies is perfectly 
compatible with a willingness to challenge the status quo, to reject US-favored positions, and to 
favor new forms of global governance.”54China will engage in reciprocal adjustments and 
negotiations with its G-7 counterparts to revise the principles and regulations of global financial 
governance in the post-global crisis world, but will not put all of its eggs into a single global 
financial institution basket.55 
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The recent global financial crisis has generated heated debates over the future of global 
financial governance. Some leading experts contend that the world would face a “more 
decentralized and fragmented form of international financial governance”, a new geopolitical 
reality that comprises a “variety of regional systems,” or a “leaderless currency system.”56The 
strategic behavior of a rising China could reinforce these decentralizing trends in international 
financial governance. As the international monetary system is presently in flux, one cannot 
judge whether China’s policy toward international financial institutions is revisionist or status 
quo. It is obvious that China’s counterweight strategy is unlikely to reverse the decentralizing 
tendency in global financial governance in the near future. China is not an immediate cause but 
can be a facilitator of the fragmentation and decentralization of global financial governance. 
China would continue to advocate a minimalist approach to regional institutions. This 
sovereignty-sensitive approach may encourage East Asia to adopt the least controversial 
principles possible, with which all Asian member countries must comply, while allowing for 
greater policy flexibility.  For instance, a country that is focused more on financial stability (or 
security) than on financial innovation (or development) would not only be required to meet 
regionally coordinated minimum principles and standards for the Asian bond market, but would 
also be allowed to apply stricter regulations to the financial activities of both national and 
foreign institutions. The implementation of ABF2 reflects the logic of principled minimalism as 
discussed above. Such a more country-tailored approach marks divergence from the neo-liberal 
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universal regulations. Meanwhile, the China-centered CMIM intends to complement the role of 
the IMF in crisis management in the long run. While its IMF linkage has made the CMIM look 
less independent and exclusive, the CMIM also has the potential to develop an independent 
regional surveillance mechanism and a regionally-tailored conditionality, which could be a 
significant departure from the ‘one-size-fits-all’ IMF approach.57   
As a result, global, regional, or even bilaterally tailored institutions and arrangements may 
coexist and compete with or complement one another. This is inconsistent with both the views 
of eventual assimilation and systemic conflict. At this juncture, we cannot make any definitive 
conclusions on transformations we are living through not least because we are still living with 
the midst of the global financial crisis, power transition and normative fragmentation. 
Nonetheless, hopefully this non-dichotomous view of Chinese foreign financial policy can make 
an initial contribution towards a growing body of research on rising powers’ sophisticated 
attempts at reshaping the prevailing global governance in the post-global crisis world.    
                                                          
57
 In addition to China’s promotion of the CMIM and the ABF, while it is somewhat too early to conclude, 
China’s recent drive to internationalize its currency (reminbi) would possibly facilitate the rise of a fragmented 
mode of global currency system in the future. Moreover, unless the emerging reform consensus among the key 
global financial regulators represents Chinese preference, Beijing may support the idea of a decentralized 
architecture for the new Financial Stability Board (FSB)—a successor to the Financial Stability Forum—established 
by the 2009 London Summit. In this view, the Asian Financial Stability Dialogue around the FSB, as proposed by the 
Asian Development Bank, could play a supportive role by translating FSB initiatives into a regional context, helping 
to implement them, and collecting regional inputs for the FSB decision making process.  
